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1. Introduction
Frequent and widespread bank panics have been ruining banking sectors most commonly in
emerging economies: 1995-1997 in Bulgaria, 1997 in Hungary, 1994 in Estonia, 1995 in Latvia and
Lithuania, 1998 in Russia, etc (Tang et al., 2000). Given the disastrous consequences of bank panics,
alternative options to mitigate them are urgently needed.1
Theoretical research on panics is inspired by the influential article by Diamond &
Dybvig (1983), who analyzes intertemporal risk sharing, liquidity insurance (consumption
smoothing) and panics in static intragenerational model.2 The model was advanced to the dynamic
overlapping generation economies by Qi (1994), Bhattacharya & Padilla (1996), Fulghieri &
Rovelli (1998) and Bhattacharya & Fulghieri & Rovelli (1998). The articles contribute to the
theoretical debate on the relative merits of banks and capital markets in promoting economic
development. In view of the broad agreement of the relevance of the contributions, it is a bit
surprising that the overlapping generation model has not been utilized in investigating panics, even
through it supplies a rich framework for the investigation.3 Several aspects that cannot be fully
1 Deposit insurance offers the standard option to prevent panics. Yet, according to theoretical research, e.g. Merton
(1977), deposit insurance encourages banks to excessive risk taking. The theoretical research is supported by empirical
evidence. Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (2002), for example, find that deposit insurance tends to increase the
likelihood of banking crises. These findings have led to calls for the eliminating deposit insurance.
2 Models, which utilize the Diamond & Dybvig framework, are still extensively used:  Von Thadden (1997, 1999),
Allen & Gale (1997, 1998), Freixas & Parigi (1998), Freixas & Parigi & Rochet (2000), Green & Lin (2000), Qi (2003),
Ennis & Keister (2003), Rochet & Vives (2004), Goldstein & Pauzner (2005) and Chen & Hasan (2006).
3 Qi’s (1994) article is an exception. He demonstrates that suspension of convertibility may not prevent panics in the
OLG-framework, since a newborn generation may refuse to save their endowments in the bank. This gives an
interesting example on the result that is unachievable in the intragenerational framework.
1investigated in the intragenarational model, can be scrutinized in the overlapping generations
model.4 This gap in the literature is in part fulfilled by this paper.
Niinimäki (2003) shows in the intragenerational model how panics can be prevented if
a bank not only attracts liquid demand deposits but also time deposits which have low interruption
value. When depositors have a differing risk of encountering a preference shock, high-risk agents
will hold their savings as demand deposits, whereas low-risk agents will prefer time deposits. A
low-risk agent appreciates the substantial long-term return of a time deposit and is willing to bear
the low-probability risk of encountering a preference shock and interrupting his time deposits. The
analysis has two main shortcomings. The bank is a monopoly and the interruption value of a time
deposit is lower than the initial deposit. This makes time deposits risky. An agent is willing to resell
an ongoing time deposit before maturity instead of interrupting it, but reselling is not possible in the
model. These shortcomings are corrected in this paper. The banking sector is perfectly competitive
and time deposits can be resold in secondary markets.
In this paper it is assumed that some agents are able to participate in capital markets
whereas others are not. A panic-free bank system is constructed utilizing maturity matching. A bank
attracts both liquid demand deposits and time deposits (alternatively stocks) so that the total
liquidation value of deposits is equal to the liquidation value of the bank assets. Given the equality,
it may appear that the bank does not boost the liquidity of the economy. The appearance is defective.
The bank provides a fundamental service to an economy by transforming the constant liquidity of
its assets to deposits with varying liquidity. Demand deposits are more liquid than bank assets.
Time deposits are nominally less liquid than bank assets, since they cannot be interrupted before
maturity. They can, however, be resold in secondary markets and thus are effectively liquid for the
4 In the static intragenerational setting, it is extremely important that the agents cannot contact each others. If agents can
contact each other, no bank can be established (see Jacklin, 1987; Wallace, 1988; Diamond, 1997). These problems can
be eliminated in the OLG-framework (see Qi, 1994).
2agents who can participate in the markets. Time deposits (or bank stocks) are optimally chosen by
the agents who can participate in capital markets whereas others prefer demand deposits. Given the
marketability of time deposits, both demand deposits and time deposits are more liquid than the
assets of the bank, and thus the bank boosts the liquidity of the economy even under maturity
matching.
The paper displays that time deposits and stock capital stabilize banking system
efficiently and almost in an identical manner. Stabilization may, however, be expensive, since the
agents who can participate in capital markets would require the same return on their time deposits
(and bank stocks) to what they can obtain by investing directly in firms. If the costs of stabilization
are high, they may make banking unprofitable. To avoid this, a bank regulator may decide to offer
deposit insurance. Panics can be prevented without the excessive burden of time deposits (or stock
capital) and thus banks can pay moderate return on demand deposits.
The assumption that only a fraction of agents can participate in the capital markets is
borrowed from Diamond (1997). However, he uses the intragenerational model, whereas this paper
adopts the framework of overlapping generations, which generates different results. Furthermore,
Diamond concentrates on liquidity insurance, whereas this paper also examines panics.
32. Economy
Consider an infinite horizon economy with an infinite sequence of overlapping generations of
agents. A new generation is born at every time { },...2,1,0Ît  and consists of a continuum of agents
of measure 1. Newborn agents are endowed with 1 unit of a homogeneous good, which can be spent
for either consumption or production. An agent born at time t  lives with certainty at 1+t  and
possibly also at 2+t . The agents of the first type thus live for one period only, consume at time
1+t , and are labelled early consumers. Those of the second type live for two periods, consume at
2+t  and are identified as late consumers. An agent born at t  learns his type (early or later
consumer) privately at time 1+t . Agents become early or late consumers with constant probabilites
e  and e-1  respectively.  The population is assumed to be so large that there is no uncertainty
regarding the aggregate distribution between early and late consumers. A constant share e  of
agents born at t  consumes at 1+t , whereas the rest consume at 2+t . Therefore, a newborn has an
expected utility
)()1()( 21 cUcUW ee -+= . (1)
Here 1c  denotes the level of consumption of an early consumer and 2c  represents the consumption
of a later consumer. The utility function is strictly increasing and concave: ,0(.)'',(.)' <UU
0)(',)0(' =¥¥= UU . The assumption ¥=)0('U  implies -¥=)0(U .
Thus, at each time t  , 2³t , there are four groups of agents. One, newborns of
generation t  (these agents are born at t ). Their total measure is 1. Two, early consumers of
generation 1-t  (measure e ). Three, late consumers of generation 1-t  (measure e-1 ). Four, later
consumers of generation 2-t  (measure e-1 ). At each time point there are e-3  agents and groups
4two and four consume. Since there is no uncertainty regarding the aggregate distribution between
early and late consumers, the demographic structure of the population is constant through time.
Two technologies are available. The first is risk-free long-term production with
constant returns of scale. An investment of one unit at t  produces 1>R  units at 2+t . The
liquidation value of production is 10 << l  units. The second technology is storage. Consumption
can be transferred from one period to the next without any loss or depreciation. To emphasize the
importance of banks and capital markets the following assumption is made
Assumption 1. 1)1( <-+ Rl ee .
This assumption states that in autarky (each agent produces his own consumption) an agent prefers
storage to the long-term production. Given the risk to liquidate early and the low liquidation value,
the expected returns from production are lower than the returns from storage. Therefore, there is no
production in autarky. The following assumption guarantees that the liquidation value of long-term
production is low and makes a bank vulnerable to bank panics
Assumption 2. e-< 1l .
New production can be started at each time point. This generates a sequence of overlapping
technologies which are at different stages of the production process. At each time point, different
stages exist: production at the start up stage, production at the intermediate stage and production
that materializes.
The following extension is based on Diamond (1997). It is assumed that a fraction
10 << a  of agents are active. They can contact each other and thus participate in a capital markets.
The rest of the agents, a-1 , are passive, live in isolation (see Wallace, 1988), cannot contact each
5other and thereby cannot participate in capital markets. They can, however, contact a bank. The
fractions of early consumers and late consumers are assumed to be independent of the agent’s
ability to participate in capital markets.
As is standard for the OLG models, the analysis focuses on steady-state allocations
that yield identical ex ante return for all current and future generations. For the dynamic transition
to the steady state, see Bhattacharya & Fulghieri & Rovelli (1998) and Qi (1994).
3. Capital markets
This section, which borrows from Bhattacharya & Padilla (1996) and Fulghieri & Rovelli (1998),
characterizes the optimal steady-state consumption and investment allocations that can be achieved
by active agents, who are able to contact each other and trade stocks among themselves.5
The stock markets operate as follows. At each time point t   there are newborn agents
who are endowed with a unit of consumption good. Each newborn sets up a firm, which invests a
fraction of the endowment, 1£I , in production. A part of the firm’s stocks is retained by the
newborn, who sells the remaining stock to other agents. The selling revenue and the rest of the
endowment, I-1 , are invested by him in the stocks of firms set up by the other agents. There are
three age groups of firms at each time point: new firms which have started their production at t ,
intermediate firms that started their production at 1-t  and old firms that started their production at
2-t . The production of old firms materializes and is paid out as dividends.
The economy has three markets: (1) A market for goods, with their unit price
normalized to one. (2) A market for the stocks of new firms; (3) a market for the stocks of
intermediate firms. The following labels are used.
=nP    The unit price for the stock of a new firm, n
5 For initial research on stocks in the Diamond & Dybvig model, see Jacklin (1987) and Jacklin & Bhattacharya (1988).
6=iP     The unit price for the stock of an intermediate firm, i
=0nq    The agent’s, whose age is 0 (a newborn), ownership in new firms, n
=0iq    The agent’s, whose age is 0, ownership in intermediate firms, i
=1nq    The agent’s, whose age is 1 (an intermediate agent), ownership in new firms
=1iq    The agent’s, whose age is 1, ownership in intermediate firms
To maximize his expected utility, an agent optimizes his consumption and investment decisions. A
newborn’s budget constraint is
iinnn PPIIP
001 qq ++=+ . (2)
The L.H.S constitutes the initial income: an endowment and the selling revenues from the stocks of
his firm, IPn . The R.H.S shows that the income is invested in long-term production I (the set up
cost of the firm), in the stocks of new firms, nn P
0q  (including his own firm) and in the stocks of the
intermediate firms, ii P
0q .
At time 1+t  a newborn learns whether he is an early or late consumer. If he turns out
to be an early consumer, he avoids the interruption of long-term production by selling his stocks
and by consuming the selling revenue as well as his dividend income
RPC iin
00
1 qq += . (3)
7At time t , the agent invested nn P
0q  in new firms. The updated selling price of these stocks is in P
0q .
Furthermore, at t  the agent invested ii P
0q  in the intermediate firms. The value of these stocks is
now Ri
0q , since the production materializes.
At 1+t  the newborn alternatively can learn that he is a late consumer. He owns, of
course, the same stocks as if he were an early consumer, +in P
0q Ri
0q . This wealth can be
reallocated by him. The late consumer’s budget constraint at 1+t  is
iinniin PPRP
1100 qqqq +=+ . (4)
The L.H.S indicates the inherited portfolio from time t  , whereas the reallocated portfolio is on the
R.H.S. The reallocated portfolio is consumed by the late consumer at 2+t
RPC iin
11
2 qq += . (5)
The prices of stocks must be such that arbitrage in the stock markets is eliminated
010
1
P
R
P
R
P
P
== . (6)
The term 01 PP  expresses the returns from new stocks and 1PR  indicates the returns from the
stocks of intermediate firms. The term 0PR  can be constructed using 01 PP  and 1PR .
8No arbitrage is allowed between stock markets and production. A unit of production
yields R  units after two periods. This must be as productive as the investment in new stocks. Hence,
it requires that 10 =P . This, together with (6) implies RP =1 .
6
Both production markets and stock markets must clear (for simplicity, the size of the
stock markets here is 1 although only active agents can participate in the markets)
.)1().
)1().
1)1(.)
10
10
21
Iiii
Iii
IRICCi
ii
nn
=-+
=-+
+-=-+
qeq
qeq
ee
 (7)
Here .)i  states that consumption is equal to production. At every time point t , both the early
consumers of generation 1-t  and the late consumers of generation 2-t  consume. Production, IR ,
is based on the investment, I , by generation 2-t . Note that RIR <  , if not all of the endowment
is invested in new production, 1<I . Additionally, .)ii  determines that the volume of new stocks is
6 It is necessary to investigate arbitrage in more detail. The following analysis is borrowed from Bhattacharya & Padilla
(1996). Suppose first that 10 >P and consider the following arbitrage strategy. A newborn short sells 11 P  units of
intermediate stocks.  He invests the selling revenue, one unit, in long-term production, sells the stocks of production and
earns 10 >P . The selling revenue is invested in 10 PP  intermediate stocks. These stocks represent the agent’s long
position, whereas his short position consists of
1
1 P  units of intermediate stocks. Since 10 >P , the newborn makes an
arbitrage profit, 10 )1( PPR - . Suppose now that 10 <P  , but 011 PPPR =  . Then, a newborn will not set up a firm
of his own. Instead, he invests the endowment in the stocks of the other new firms and obtains either a two-period return
RPR >
0
 or one-period return 11 0 PPP >  .  In sum, it must be 10 =P . It is easy to see that when 10 =P , it must be
RP =1  (recall (6)).
9equal to the amount of production, while .)iii expresses the same requirement for intermediate
stocks. The optimal consumption and investment allocations can now be reviewed.7
Proposition 1 (Fulghieri & Rovelli, 1998). In the stock markets, the steady state competitive
equilibrium satisfies
1
1
)(10,,,,1 *2110 <-
-
-=<====
R
RRIRCRCRPP e .
Here 1<I  since not all of the endowment is invested in new production, but I-1  is invested in
intermediate stocks. Recall that in autarky an agent optimally stores the endowment and obtains
utility )1(u . Hence, the formation of stock markets boosts the expected utility. It is possible to
invest in production and obtain liquidity by trading the stocks of production so that the interruption
of long-term production is avoided.
7 Above, it was shown that RPRP == 10 , . Substituting these into (2)-(5) provides after some manipulation
RCRC == 21 , . Inserting this into 7i.) gives )1()(1
* ---= RRRI e .
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4. Bank
This section highlights liquidity provision through a bank system. Since a fraction a-1  of agents
are passive and thus unable to participate in capital markets, a bank system offers them the only
option for investment and liquidity. The section is based on the analysis of Qi (1994), Bhattacharya
& Padilla (1996) and Fulghieri & Rovelli (1998). To begin, the occurrence of panics is clarified.
Definition 1. The agents predict that a panic may occur. The predictions come true and a panic
occurs, if a late consumer obtains a higher expected return by joining a predicted panic than by
waiting for the next time point, or if a newborn will not save his endowment in a bank.
Here a late consumer is an agent, whose true consumption time is in the next time point.
Definition 2 . A bank operates under maturity mismatch, when the total liquidation value of its
deposits exceeds the liquidation value of its assets.
Given Definition 1, maturity mismatch triggers a panic with certainty, since only the very first
withdrawers can regain possession of their deposits. Thereafter, once bank assets are exhausted, it
fails and the last withdrawers obtain nothing. Therefore, it is optimal to panic.
A bank is established by passive agents who save their endowment in it. The bank
attracts only demand deposits and promises to pay 1D  for withdrawals made after one period and
2D  for withdrawals made after two periods. The payments are chosen so that the expected utility of
a depositor is maximized8
8 Here the bank is modelled as if its size were 1 instead of a-1 . That is, the multiplications by a-1  are dropped.
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The expected utility (8a) is maximized subject to the resource constraint (8b). The L.H.S of (8b)
represents consumption; at t , both the early consumers of generation 1-t  and the late consumers
of generation 2-t  consume. The R.H.S shows resources. The first term is the endowment, 1, from
which the production investment, I , is subtracted. The resources also include the returns from the
liquidated production, L , production output, )( LIR - , and the costs of banking per a size unit, B .
(8c) is needed to eliminate arbitrage by depositors; a later consumer will not mimic an early
consumer by withdrawing 1D  at 1+t  and redepositing it in another bank for a period. This strategy
would yield 2)1(D  and it cannot be more profitable than retaining the savings in the original bank
(see Qi, 1994). Since the agents are risk averse, (8c) is binding. As regards to (8d), 1£I  states that
the production investment cannot exceed the amount of the endowment. Additionally, in (8e), the
returns from liquidation, L , cannot exceed the liquidation value of the whole production, lI  . It is
easy to see that the R.H.S of (8b) is maximized when 0=L ; no production is liquidated. Constraint
(8f) determines the operating costs of banking. Since )2()1( e--< RB , the operating costs are
so low that banking is profitable. The second part, )( RRB -> e , sets a lower limit for the
operating costs.9 Given 0=L  and 2)1(2 DD = , the maximization problem simplifies to
9 The positive costs of operation have been adopted for several reasons. First, they are realistic. Mishkin (2007, p. 221)
documents: “In recent years, interest paid on deposits (checkable and time) has accounted for around 25% of total bank
12
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It is easy to see from (9a) that the expected utility is maximized when 2D  is maximal. The maximal
value of 2D  is determined by the resource constraint, (9b). Since the resources are largest when
1=I , (9b) can be rewritten as BRDD )2()1( 22 eee --=-+ . Given this and (9d), it is known
that 12 >D ; interest on deposits is positive. Furthermore, the rewritten resource constraint satisfies
BRDDD )2()( 222 ee --=-- . If RD =2 , the consumption (the R.H.S ) exceeds the
resources (the L.H.S) due to (9d). Thus, it is known that RD <2 . A conclusion follows.
Proposition 2 . The bank’s optimal allocation satisfies RDD <<< *2
*
11 ,
*
21* DD =  and 1=I .
Therefore, the bank can offer positive return and liquidity to agents. However, they receive lower
return than what could be achieved in the capital markets (Proposition 1) due to the costs of banking.
Unfortunately, the bank is threaten by panics. The late consumers of generation 2-t
withdraw 2)1( De-  and the early consumers of the next generation withdraw 1De  even without a
operating expenses, while the costs involved in serving accounts (employee salaries, building rent, and so on) have been
approximately 50% of operating expenses.” Second, due to the operating costs, demand deposits are less productive
than stocks. Without the operating costs, demand deposits would be as productive as stocks, which would be unrealistic.
Third, it is seen later that the operating costs motivate the bank to minimize the amount of bank capital. Fourth, the
lower limit of the operating costs is so high that the payments on demand deposits satisfy RD £
2
. Thus, it is not
necessary to set an extra restriction RD £
2
 in order to eliminate interbank deposits as in Bhattacharya & Padilla (1996).
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panic, since their true consumption time point is present. During a panic, the late consumers of
generation 1-t  mimic early consumers and withdraw 1)1( De-  . If the newborns panic and do not
save their endowments in the bank, the resources of the bank consist of materializing production, R ,
and from the liquidated intermediate production, llI = . The resources cover the withdrawals if
lDDDBR +------- 112 )1()1()2( eeee . (10)
The sum of the first 4 terms is zero owing to the resource constraint. Given Assumption 2, it is
known that l>- e1 . The liquidation value of the intermediate production is so low that it does not
cover payments on deposits and the bank fails due to maturity mismatch, .0)1( 1 <+-- lDe
Therefore, if an agent predicts a bank panic, he rationally withdraws his deposits and the panic
actually occurs. Given Definition 1, a panic occurs with certainty. Furthermore, since the last
withdrawers do not get anything, their utility is -¥=)0(u . As a result, a rational agent will not
deposit initially his endowment in the bank, but instead he stores it. No bank is established although
a panic-free bank system could raise the expected returns of the agents and provide the desired
liquidity. Consequently, it is important to investigate different options for preventing panics. 10
10 For somewhat sceptical studies regarding the optimality of demand deposits in the Diamond & Dybvig setting, see
Jacklin (1987), Postlewaite & Vives (1987), Jacklin & Bhattacharya (1988),Wallace (1988) and Green & Lin (2000).
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5. Bank with subordinated time deposits
This section examines how panics can be prevented if the bank attracts not only liquid demand
deposits, but also time deposits, which cannot be interrupted before maturity. Passive agents favour
demand deposits, whereas active agents save with marketable time deposits.
5.1 Market of time deposits
The characteristics of time deposits and the operations of the market for time deposits are
approached first. It is assumed that there are sufficiently active agents to save in time deposits. The
assumption is later dropped.
A time deposit lasts for two periods. It cannot be interrupted after the first period, but
can then be resold. The bank attracts A2
1  new time deposits at each time point and thus the volume
of outstanding time deposits is equal to A . How much does the bank pay on time deposits? The
bank is established by passive agents and it maximizes their expected utility, thereby minimizing
payments on time deposits. Time deposits need to be at least as productive as the stocks of firms,
which yield an allocation R  , R  to an active agent (an early consumer, a late consumer).
Suppose that the bank pays interest R  on a time deposit at maturity, that is, after two periods. Let
TDP1  denote the resale price of an intermediate time deposit. Arbitrage is eliminated if
TDP
R
P
R
P
R
P
P
1010
1 === . (11)
The first 3 terms are the same as before (recall (6)), while the fourth term indicates the return of a
time deposit from the intermediate stage to maturity. It has been shown above that
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RPP == 10 ,1 . It must be RP
TD =1 . Thus, at maturity the bank pays interest R  on time
deposits, which cannot be interrupted before maturity, but which can be resold at the market price
R  at the intermediate stage.
After the introduction of time deposits, the budget constraints and consumption
allocations of an active agent are11
00001 inin RR qqbb +++= . (12)
RRRRRC ini
o
n =+++=
000
1 qqbb .
1111
inin RRR qqbb +++= .
RRRRRC inin =+++=
1111
2 qqbb .
Here 0nb  ( 1nb ) denotes the newborn’s (late consumer’s) savings in new time deposits and 0ib ( 1ib )
represents his savings in intermediate time deposits. In (12), the first line expresses the newborn’s
budget constraint; he splits the endowment between new time deposits, intermediate time deposits,
the stocks of new firms and the stocks of intermediate firms. The price of a new stock or a new time
deposit is one unit and the price of an intermediate stock or time deposit is R  units. The second
line indicates the consumption of an early consumer. With each asset portfolio, the realized
consumption is R . If the agent becomes a later consumer, he can reallocate his wealth, R , at the
intermediate stage. This is showed in the third line, whereas the fourth line indicates the realized
consumption of a late consumer. Whatever his portfolio, he can consume R  units.
Both stock markets and the markets of time deposits must clear
11 It is assumed that each active newborn chooses the same allocation and each active late consumer chooses the same
allocation.
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Here .)(. iii  states that total savings in new (intermediate) time deposits are equal to the supply of
new (intermediate) time deposits. Additionally, .)(. iviii  indicates that total savings in new
(intermediate) stocks are equal to the supply of new (intermediate) stocks. The supply of stocks is
flexible; the larger the supply of time deposits, the less can be invested directly in the stocks of the
firms, AI 2
1* -a . The term is positive when there are sufficiently active agents in the economy to
fulfil the supply of time deposits. Recall that the amount of direct investment in long-term
production, *Ia , is smaller than the volume of active agents, a , since the agents optimally invest
a part of their endowment in intermediate assets.
One market clearing solution is the following: ,0, 12
10 == nn A bb a ,2
1*0 AIn aq -=
01 =nq ,
*00 1 Iii -=+ bq  and 1
11 =+ ii qb . Late consumers do not invest in new assets (time
deposits or stocks), which are channelled to newborns, who invest the rest of their endowments in
intermediate assets. If a newborn later becomes an early consumer, he keeps the returns from
maturing assets and sells the intermediate assets ( ,2
10 An ab = AIn aq 2
1*0 -= ) to the late
consumers of his generation ( 11, ii qb ) and to the newborns of the next generation (
00 , ii qb ). The
market for intermediate time deposits clears since their supply, 0neb , is equal to demand,
))(1( 010 nii bbeb --+ , that is,
100 )1( iin bebb -+= ,  or
10
2
1 )1( iiA beba -+= . (14)
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This is equal to (13ii) and thus it is always true. Equally, the market for stocks clears because their
supply, 0nqe  is equal to demand, ))(1(
010
nii qqeq --+ , that is,
100 )1( iin qeqq -+= ,  or
10
2
1* )1( iiAI qeqa -+=- , (15)
which is equal to (13iv). Therefore, the markets of intermediate time deposits and stocks clear. It is
easy to check that under these allocations an early consumer can consume R units and a late
consumer R  units (recall (12)).
5.2  The optimal amount of time deposits
This subsection shows that the optimal amount of time deposits is the minimum amount that is
needed to satisfy the maturity matching constraint. With time deposits, the resource constraint of the
bank is
[ ] [ ] [ ]222121 )1()1()2)(1()1( DDRBR eeaeaa -+-+A=A+---A+- .               (16)
The first term on the L.H.S represents production output. At each time point the bank attracts a-1
new demand deposits and A2
1  new time deposits and invests the funds in production. The second
term states the costs of banking that are dependent on the amount of deposits. Passive newborns,
a-1 , save with demand deposits. In addition, the passive late consumers of the previous
generation have demand deposits, )1)(1( ea --  in all. Given time deposits, A , the total amount of
deposits adds up to A+-- )2)(1( ea . The first term on the R.H.S indicates payments on maturing
time deposits and the second term displays payments on demand deposits. Some manipulation gives
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This reveals 02 <AdDd ; time deposits reduce payments on demand deposits. It is optimal to
minimize the amount of time deposits. Intuitively, each bank account, including both demand and
time deposits, incurs an equal cost B  to the bank. Yet, active agents require the very same return
on their time deposits to what they could achieve by investing directly in firm stocks. Thus, the
costs of time deposits, B , are borne entirely by the depositors who save in demand deposits.
The minimum amount of time deposits is determined by maturity matching. The late
consumers of generation 2-t  as well as the early consumers of generation 1-t  withdraw their
deposits with certainty. During a panic, newborns do not save their endowment in the bank.
Additionally, the late consumers of generation 1-t  panic and mimic early consumers by intending
to withdraw their deposits. Only intermediate time deposits cannot be withdrawn. The maturity
matching constraint is satisfied if
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The first 4 terms together form a resource constraint and their sum is equal to zero. The bank can
pull through the panic if [ ]*212 )1()1)(1( AlD +-=-- aea . The minimum amount of time
deposits that prevents panics, *A  (which is also the optimal amount of time deposits), satisfies
[ ]
l
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A
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. (18)
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Intuitively, the stabilizing effect of time deposits is simple. Since time deposits increase the
liquidation value of intermediate production but cannot be interrupted, they help create maturity
matching. More precisely, without time deposits the value of demand deposits exceeds the
liquidation value of intermediate production, >-- 2)1)(1( Dea )1( a-l  , which makes the
bank vulnerable to panics. However, an amount of time deposits exists *21 A  so that the value of
demand deposits is equal to the increased liquidation value of intermediate production,
=-- 2)1)(1( Dea
*
2
1)1( All +-a . Maturity matching is satisfied and the bank can pay back
deposits if a panic occurs.
5.3 Special rules
This subsection confirms that panic-free banking system can be achieved only if the maturity
matching constraint is supported with special rules.
First, it is shown that time deposits need to be subordinated to demand deposits. In the
next time point after a panic, the bank cannot settle the promised payments on deposits in full,
because some production has been liquidated during the panic, and the materializing value of the
production is low. Suppose that in this case the bank adopts “a fear sharing rule”. Each depositor
receives an equal share, f , of the promised payment when the bank cannot settle the payments in
full. That is, the bank pays 2*Df  units on long-term demand deposits and Rf *  units on long-term
time deposits, 1<f . Without a panic, the bank can pay the promised payments in all, 1=f .
Suppose now that the maturity matching requirement is satisfied, but a panic occurs.
Only intermediate time deposits, which cannot be interrupted, are retained in the bank. Given
maturity matching, the value of bank assets, intermediate production, erodes to zero. Thus, at the
next time point, the bank has no materializing production, it cannot pay anything on maturing time
deposits and it fails.
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Is a panic withdrawal of demand deposits rational? Suppose that one late consumer
opts to sit out the panic and does not withdraw 1D . The bank has then 1D  units of intermediate
production. In the next time point, the production materializes yielding RD1  units. Under the fair
sharing rule, RD1  units are shared equally among the agents; that is, between the late consumer
with demand deposits and the agents who have maturing time deposits. As a result, the agents with
time deposits can share RD1 , whereas the late consumer with demand deposits does not obtain
anything (the measure of his demand deposits is zero and the total measure of the time deposits is
positive. Hence, the whole return is paid on time deposits). By joining the panic and withdrawing
his demand deposits the late consumer can obtain 1D . Thus, the panic withdrawal of demand
deposits is rational.
Consequently, maturity matching is a necessary condition to prevent panics, but not a
sufficient condition. It guarantees that a late consumer, who saves in demand deposits, can obtain
the allocation of the early consumer by withdrawing immediately. Unfortunately, it does not
guarantee that the late consumer obtains a higher return in waiting for his true consumption time
than in withdrawing the allocation of the early consumer at once.
Consider an identical case, but in which time deposits are now subordinated to
demand deposits. One late consumer does not join the panic and withdraws 1D . The bank has 1D
units of intermediate production. In the next time point, the production materializes yielding RD1
units. Since 21 DRD >  and since demand deposits are senior to time deposits, the late consumer
receives the promised return, 2D . Thus, he rationally opts to sit out the panic. Since each late
consumer acts in the same manner, each waits for the next time point and thus demand deposits are
retained in the bank. No intermediate production is interrupted and it materializes in the next time
point yielding [ ]A+- 21)1( aR , which covers the operating costs as well as the payments on long-
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term demand deposits, 2D , and time deposits, R  (recall the resource constraint (16)). Something is
even left over for the early consumers of the next generation, 1)1( Dea- .  A conclusion follows.
Lemma 1. When time deposits are subordinated to demand deposits, both demand deposits and
time deposits are retained in the bank and no intermediate production is liquidated.
Consider time point t . Under Lemma 1, the agents of generation 1-t  do not panic and withdraw
their deposits. The agents of the new generation, generation t , need to be explored. These newborns,
who ought to save their endowment in the bank, can panic by keeping their endowments out of the
banking system. The following specification is made.
Assumption 3. To avoid a maturity mismatch, the bank promises to pay back the deposits of
newborns at once if it cannot attract the sufficient shares of both deposit types.
The promise protects newborns. If the bank cannot remain maturity matching, the newborns receive
their endowments back.  Thus, they cannot lose anything at time point t .
The agents of generation t  need to be certain that their savings are also protected in
the next time points. Consider time point 1+t . The case of time deposits is easy to analyze, since
they cannot be interrupted. In addition, under Lemma 1 the panic withdrawal of intermediate
demand deposits is prevented at 1+t . Thus, both deposit types are retained in the bank and no
intermediate production is interrupted. Furthermore, the value of intermediate demand and time
deposits at 1+t  is independent of whether or not the next generation, generation 1+t , saves their
endowment in the bank.
The agents of generation t  need to be assured that their savings are also protected at
time point 2+t . Then, the decision of the newest generation (generation 2+t ), whether or not to
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save in the bank, has no effect on the payments on maturing time deposits and long-term demand
deposits. Neither has the decision of the previous generation (generation 1+t ) any effect on
payments. To see this, two cases need to be examined. First, if generation 1+t  saves their
endowment in the bank at 1+t , the bank keeps on operating normally and it can pay R  on time
deposits and 2D  on long-term demand deposits at 2+t . Second, if generation 1+t  panics and
does not save its endowments in the bank at 1+t , the returns of generation t  do not change. The
production output is R  at 2+t  and is sufficient to pay R  on time deposits and 2D  on long-term
demand deposits. Since a part of the output, 1)1( Dea- , is reserved for the early consumers of
generation 1+t , but as this generation did not even save in a bank, the bank has extra returns,
1)1( Dea- . Thus, the agents of generation t  can be sure that their deposits are safe at 2+t .
Therefore, under Lemma 1 the newborns of generation t  can be sure that their
deposits will be safe regardless of whether the newborns of the next generations panic or save their
endowments in the bank. Consequently, the newborns of each generation will save their
endowments in the bank and no panics occur.
Since time deposits are now subordinated to demand deposits, the panic-preventing
amount of time deposits needs to be updated
[ ]
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The previous analysis can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. Panics can be prevented using maturity matching. The bank attracts not only
demand deposits but also time deposits, which are uninterruptible, but which can be resold in
secondary markets. Passive agents obtain liquidity by saving in demand deposits and active agents
by saving in marketable time deposits. Since time deposits incur excessive costs for the bank, it
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minimizes the volume of time deposits so that the maturity matching constraint is only barely
satisfied. Due to the operating costs of banking, the bank can offer a lower return to agents than
what these could obtain by investing directly in firms.
5.4 Numeric example I
Suppose the following economy: 64.0,35.0,3.0,025.0,15.1 ===== lBR ae . The agents
who can participate in capital markets obtain 15.1=R  (a long-term return). Without time deposits,
the bank can offer 127.12 =D to its depositors, but the bank is vulnerable to runs since l>- e1 . With
time deposits, the bank can offer 124.12 =D . The amount of time deposits is 074.0 , whereas the
amount of demand deposits is 7.12 =- e  . Hence, the ratio of time deposits to total deposits is 4.2%.
It is easy to see that capital markets can supply higher returns than a bank, since
banking incurs costs. In addition, the bank can pay more on demand deposits without stabilizing
time deposits. Thus, the bank regulator can raise the expected utility of passive agents if it can offer
deposit insurance at no cost. Then, the bank can avoid panics without the burden of time deposits
and pay more on demand deposits. In this example the differences in payments on demand deposits
are small, since the necessary amount of time deposits is modest and the operating costs are low.12
12 If the operating costs of banking are zero, 0=B , the bank can offer the same optimal allocation ),( RR  to passive
agents to what the active agents can obtain by investing directly in firms.
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6. Bank with stock capital
This section extends the analysis by exploring whether stock capital can be used to prevent panics.
How does stock capital differ from time deposits in this context? Is there any difference at all?
6.1 Firm-E
The operation of capital markets was reviewed in section 4. Each agent set up a firm of his own and
sold a part of its stock to other agents. The sales revenue was invested by him in the stocks of the
other firms. Suppose now that the agents coordinate their actions and put together numerous small
firms of unit size.  The size of the big firm, Firm-E, is E  . It has E2
1  units of production started in
2-t  and E2
1  units of production started at 1-t . The process continues in the following time
points. At each time point, old production materializes yielding RE2
1 . The firm reinvests a part of
it, E2
1 , in new production and pays out the remainder, )1(2
1 -RE  , as dividends.
6.2  Bank with stock capital
The bank makes the following suggestion to agents. Instead of setting up Firm-E, the agents should
invest the same amount, E , as stock capital in the bank, which commits to pay a fixed dividend
)1(2
1 -RE  at each time point. Since stock capital is naturally subordinated on demand deposits, the
order of moves is the following at each time point
1. The bank pays back demand deposits.
2. The bank pays out dividends.
3. Stockholders can trade stocks.
At each time point, after paying out dividends, the market price of a stock unit is
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For simplicity, it is assumed that some fraction, e  , of active newborns invest only in bank stocks,
whereas other active agents, e-a , invest only in firm stocks. Consider first the active newborns
who invest in bank stocks. Given the endowment, each of them can initially purchase SP1  bank
stocks. After the first period, the wealth of the agent is
R
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R
S
=
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1
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where the first term shows the value of SP1  bank stocks and the second term represents dividend
payments on the stocks. Thus, an early consumer can consume R . If the agent becomes a late
consumer, he invests the dividend income in additional bank stocks. After the additional acquisition,
he has SPR  bank stocks. After the second period the wealth of the agent amounts to
,
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+                                                                                                                (21)
which is equal to R , which can be consumed by the late consumer.
The market of bank stocks clears. To see this, note that at each time point the supply
of bank stocks consists of the stocks sold by the early consumers of generation-t and of the sales by
the late consumers of generation- t-1
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The stocks are demanded by newborns, SPe , and by late consumers, who invest their dividend
income in additional stocks, SS PPRe 1*)1()1( 21 -- e . After some manipulation, the total
demand can be expressed as in (23).
The rest of the active agents, e-a , invest their endowment directly in firm stocks.
The consumption allocations of the agents are identical to the above, RR , . The market clearing
constraints for the stocks of the firms are
.)()1)(()(,)()1)(()( *10*10 IEEEIEEE iinn -=--+--=--+- aqeaqaaqeaqa  (24)
The first equality states that the investments in new stocks are equal to the supply of stocks. The
second equality gives the same information for intermediate stocks. One solution is, again, the
following. Late consumers do not invest in new stocks ( 01 =nq ), which are channelled to newborns,
who invest the rest of their endowment in intermediate stocks. If a newborn later becomes an early
consumer, he keeps the income from maturing stocks and sells the intermediate stocks,
*0 In =q units, to the late consumers of his generation (
1
iq ) and to the newborns of the next
generation ( 0iq ). The market for intermediate firm stocks clears, because their supply,
0
nqe  is
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equal to demand, ))(1( 010 nii qqeq --+ , that is,
100 )1( iin qeqq -+= . This is always true (see (24)
when 01 =nq ). Thus, the market of firm stocks clears.
The fraction of agents who need to invest in bank stocks, e , can be solved by noting
that at each time point bank stocks are held by newborns, SPe , and by late consumers,
SPRe)1( e- . The total holdings need to equal to the amount of bank stocks, E .  It is easy to
solve
*
2
1
I
E
e = . (25)
6.3 The optimal amount of stock capital, E*
The resource constraint of the bank is
[ ] [ ] [ ]222121 )1()1()2)(1()1( DDREEBER eeaeaa -+-+=+---+- .             (26)
The first term represents production output. At each time point, 50% of stock capital is tied to
intermediate production and the remainder of the capital is invested in new production. The second
term gives the operating costs, which depend on the bank size. The first term on the R.H.S
expresses the costs of stock capital.  The costs total RE2
1 , consisting of dividends, ER )1(2
1 - , and
investments in new production, E2
1 .  The last term reveals the payments on demand deposits. The
resource constraint can be rewritten as
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From this it is easy to see that 02 <EdDd ; the bigger the amount of stock capital, the lower the
payments on demand deposits. Hence, the amount of stock capital is minimized. The intuition is the
same as in the context of time deposits. Each size unit incurs operating costs to the bank. Yet, active
agents require the very same return on bank stocks to what they could achieve by investing directly
in firms. Therefore, the operating costs are borne entirely by those depositors who save with
demand deposits.
The minimum amount of stock capital is determined by the maturity matching
constraint. The liquidation value of bank assets covers the liquidation value of bank deposits if
[ ] [ ] [ ]
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Dividend payments are excluded from (28) since the bank pays dividends only after the withdrawal
of deposits. Using the resource constraint, the panic-preventing amount of stock capital can
calculated
[ ]
lR
lD
E
+
---
= 2*
)1()1(2 ea
. (29)
This is equal to the panic-preventing amount of time deposits, (18’). Consider a bank with the
amount *E  of stock capital, which is naturally subordinated to demand deposits. Thanks to maturity
matching and subordination, passive agents, who have demand deposits, can rely on the bank being
able to pay the promised interest on their deposits. Thus, the agents have no reason to panic.
Furthermore, when maturity matching was created with time deposits, at each time point 50% of
time deposits matured. This caused a small problem. There was some confusion whether or not a
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new generation was ready to save in new time deposits or not. This problem is eliminated when
maturity matching is created with stock capital, which does not mature similarly to time deposits.
Therefore, it may be easier to satisfy the maturity matching constraint with stocks than with time
deposits. A conclusion follows.
Proposition 4. Stock capital helps prevent bank panics efficiently. The needed amount of stock
capital is equal to the panic-preventing amount of time deposits.
Up to now, it has been implicitly assumed that enough active agents exist who are ready to save in
bank stocks, e>a . The opposite case is explored next.
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7.  Too few active agents
7.1 Model
Until now some agents have been passive and others have been active. The ratio of active agents
has been sufficient to fulfil the supply of time deposits or bank stocks. This assumption is now
abandoned. Initially there are no active agents at all, because the agents live in isolation as in
Wallace (1988) and cannot contact each other and capital markets. The concept of isolation,
however, is not taken as seriously as in Wallace (1988). It is somewhat realistic to assume that
isolation is imperfect. Everyone can contact other agents and capital markets, but this incurs costs.
To keep the analysis simple, it is assumed that the cost of market participation or “the cost of
breaking through the isolation” erodes )1( m-  percent of the asset return in each period. As before,
suppose that the initial value of a firm stock is one unit and that its value is R  after a period. Yet,
after deducing of the costs of market participation, the value of agent’s wealth is 10, << mmR . If
he invests this in production for the second period, the value is mRmR *  or 2mR . The
erosion is assumed to be so severe that 1<mR . Therefore, the erosion makes direct investment in
firm stocks unprofitable and the agents live de facto in isolation. No agent will participate in the
markets and thus there is no capital markets at all. Alternatively, a bank could supply a liquid
investment opportunity. Yet, as has been seen above, the bank is subject to panics without time
deposits or stocks. Unfortunately, no-one is willing to invest in time deposits or stocks without the
existence of capital markets. Thus, no banks can be established. It seems that there is no way to
invest in production.
Fortunately, the case is more optimistic. Suppose that a bank attracts time deposits,
but does not issue stocks. The initial size of a time deposit is a unit and it pays TDD  units at
maturity.  The bank chooses TDD  so that
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An agent obtains the same expected utility by becoming an active agent and saving in marketable
time deposits as by remaining passive and saving in demand deposits. Since the bank maximizes the
total utility of its depositors, the interest on time deposits meets RmDDTD >=
2
2 . Thus, the
interest on time deposits exceeds the output of long-term production. However, some time deposits
are needed to prevent panics.
Above, the market value of an intermediate time deposit, TDP1 ,  was solved from the
non-arbitrage constraint
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It is easy to see TD
TD DP =1 .  The updated resource constraint of the bank is
[ ]22*21 )1()1()2( DDDABR TD eeae -+-+=-- .                      (32)
The whole production of the economy takes place through the bank. The volume of production is R
at each time point, because the size of the generation (= the investment input) is 1. The operating
costs amount to B)2( e- , since the size of the bank is e-2 , newborns and the late consumers of
the previous generation. The R.H.S includes payments on time deposits and demand deposits. The
optimal fraction of active agents satisfies
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Since it is expensive to be active, the optimal fraction of active newborns, *a , only barely fulfils
the supply of time deposits. Here ½ stems from the fact that at each time point 50% of time deposits
mature. Additionally, a part **I  of the endowment is saved in new time deposits, while the rest are
allocated to intermediate time deposits. The optimal supply of time deposits, *A , must be sufficient
to ensure maturity matching when time deposits are subordinated to demand deposits
[ ] 0)1)(1()1()1()2( 2*22* ³---+-+---- DlDDBR eaeeae .                  (34)
Given the budget constraint, the sum of the first 3 terms adds up to 2221 mDA  . It is easy to solve
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The budget constraints and consumption allocations of an active agent are
001.) iTDn Dmi bb += , 2
020
1.) DDmDmCii iTDnTD =+= bb . (36)
11
2.) iTDn DmDiii bb += , 2
121
2.) DDmDmCiv iTDnTD =+= bb .
Recall that 0nb  (
1
nb ) denotes the newborn’s (late consumer’s) savings in new time deposits and
0
ib (
1
ib ) symbolizes his savings in intermediate time deposits. In (36), i.) expresses the newborn’s
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budget constraint and ii.) the consumption of an early consumer. If the agent becomes a late
consumer, he can reallocate his wealth at the intermediate stage. This is shown by iii.), whereas iv.)
reveals the realized consumption of a late consumer.
 Additionally, the markets for time deposits need to clear
*
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11*0* )1(.))1(.) AiiAi iinn =-+=-+ beababeaba . (37)
Here .)(. iii  states that the total savings in new (intermediate) time deposits are equal to the supply
of new (intermediate) time deposits. One market clearing solution is, again, the following: recall
**
2
1* IA=a and suppose ,0, 1**0 == nn I bb 2
**0 )1( DIi -=b  , 1
1 =ib . Late consumers do
not save in new time deposits, which are channelled to newborns. They save the rest of their
endowment in intermediate time deposits. If a newborn later becomes an early consumer, he keeps
the returns from maturing time deposits and sells the intermediate time deposits to the late
consumers of his generation and to the newborns of the next generation. The market for
intermediate time deposits clears when their supply, 0neb  is equal to demand,
))(1( 010 nii bbeb --+ . This means that
100 )1( iin bebb -+= , or
2
2**
1
1
D
D
I
+
-=
e
. (38)
This is equal to (33) and thus is always true.
In sum, the agents are initially passive. Some active agents are, however, needed to
save in time deposits so that a panic-free banking system can be constructed. Thus, the bank pays
very high interest on time deposits in order to motivate a few agents to break through the isolation
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and become active. The bank determines interest on demand deposits and interest on time deposits
so that each agent obtains the same expected consumption allocation ( 22 , DD ) and a few agents
are motivated to become active. Each agent then obtains a productive saving asset. The secondary
market for time deposits clears. Due to maturity matching, the bank system is panic-free.13
Consequently, under some parameter values (this is shown later by using a numeric
example) there is no production without a bank and a bank can be established only if it pays very
high interest on time deposits. The establishment of the bank generates capital markets as a by-
product. This case is most likely to arise in the context of a small, unknown bank that operates in a
periphery, probably in an emerging economy, where there are no natural secondary markets for time
deposits. Time deposits can be made lucrative and their secondary markets can be created by paying
very high interest on them. But even then, the secondary markets of time deposits are likely to be
modest. It may take plenty of time and effort to find a willing trade partner. The required high
payments on time deposits reduce interest on demand deposits. Therefore, although it may be
possible to establish a panic-free bank system through maturity matching, the costs may be
substantial. The bank is able to pay more interest on demand deposits if the bank regulator would
offer deposit insurance and the bank could abandon stabilization through time deposits.
13 Wallace (1996) explores maturity matching from the other point of view: narrow banking. Maturity mismatch is
avoided although the bank attracts only demand deposits, since it invests funds in safe, short-term assets.
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7.2 Numeric example II
Consider an economy: 4.0,3.0,025.0,069.1 ==== lBR e . First, suppose a case where the erosion
effect is 9.0=m . It is easy to note that 02.12 »D , 29.0* »A  and 17.0* »a  . Therefore, it is possible to
motivate some agents to “break through the insolvency” by paying high interest on time deposits.
Interest on demand deposits is positive. However, it is possible to solve from =-- BR )2( e
22 )1( DD ee -+  that without time deposits the bank could pay higher interest on demand deposits,
031.12 »D . Thus, the regulator can boost the agents’ expected utility by offering deposit insurance.
Then, panics can be avoided without the burden of time deposits.
Consider an identical case but where 5.0=m . Now banking is unprofitable. The bank
cannot pay positive interest on demand deposits. Therefore, it is not possible to prevent panics by
using time deposits. Yet, a panic-free bank system can be established without time deposits, if the
regulator can offer deposit insurance.14
14 In some contexts the results of this paper differ from Diamond (1997). Diamond finds that banks may provide more
liquidity than markets (cross subsidization), whereas in this paper capital markets provide more liquidity than banks.
Additionally, according to Diamond (1997), increasing participation in capital markets weakly reduces the liquidity that
banks can create. In this paper, increasing participation in capital markets weakly raises the liquidity that banks can
create. When participation in capital markets is large – that is, the fraction of active agents is high – these agents can
fulfil the supply of marketable time deposits. The bank needs to pay interest R   on time deposits. In contrast, when
there is no market participation and active agents, the bank needs to pay very high interest on time deposits in order to
motivate some agents to become active. Interest on time deposits exceeds R and thereby strongly reduces payments on
demand deposits. Therefore, the bank can offer more liquidity (higher interest on demand deposits) when participation
in capital markets is large than in the opposite case.
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8.  Moral hazard is eliminated
It is often argued that deposits need to be liquid in order to eliminate moral hazard (e.g. Calomiris &
Kahn, 1991). This section briefly indicates that moral hazard can be eliminated in the panic-free
bank system, in which the bank also attracts time deposits.
Let us enrich the model by assuming a risky long-term project. It requires a unit of
investment and yields Rˆ  , RR >ˆ  after two periods if it succeeds. The risky project succeeds with
probability s  in every period. If it fails, the failure is irreversible and the value of the project is zero.
Thus, the final output, Rˆ , materializes with probability 2s . The NPV of the risky project is
assumed to be negative, .1ˆ2 <Rs  If a risky project is successful, but liquidated after the first period,
its liquidation value is ll <ˆ .
Suppose that a banker establishes a bank in a perfectly competitive economy. If he
operates as above and invests in safe long-term projects, which yield R  after two periods, he earns
zero returns due to competition. This tempts him to risk taking. If he promises the same interest on
deposits as above, but invests the funds in risky projects and the risk taking is successful, he earns
profits RR -ˆ . If the risk taking fails, the costs are suffered by depositors.
Suppose that the bank changes its investment strategy at time point t  and begins risk
taking. The novel strategy is observed by depositors during the same period. How do they react at
1+t  ?  The depositors who have intermediate time deposits cannot interrupt their deposits. The
depositors with demand deposits know that the maturity matching constraint is no longer satisfied
since the liquidation value of long-term risky production, lˆ , is less than the liquidation value of
long-term safe production, l . Given this together with Definitions 1 and 2, the agents with demand
deposits panic immediately. Knowing this, the banker will never switch to risk taking. He knows
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that he cannot win. If he switches to risk taking, a disciplinary panic immediately occurs and the
bank fails. Therefore, moral hazard is eliminated even through the bank also attracts time deposits.
The result follows, of course, from the assumption that the liquidation value of a risky
project is lower than the liquidation value of a safe project. In our opinion, this assumption is rather
realistic.
9.  Conclusion
The novel Basel II Accord stipulates capital requirements for banks. Two key types of capital exist:
tier 1 (e.g. common stock) and tier 2 (e.g. subordinated time deposits). The capital requirements are
determined in order to price bank risk correctly. Their existence, however, poses the question of
whether the same kind of capital requirements could also be used to prevent bank panics. Is stock
capital in this use more effective than time deposits? These questions are examined in this paper.
The paper confirms that both stock capital and time deposits offer an effective option
preventing panics. In reality, large-denomination time deposits (CDs), which can be resold in
secondary markets, are an important source of funds for banks. CDs represent approximately 16%
of the liabilities of commercial banks in the U.S and they are typically hold by corporations, money
market mutual funds and other financial institutions (Mishkin, 2007, p.221). Consequently, since
marketable time deposits represent a natural source of funds for banks, they might also offer a
natural option for preventing panics.
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